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"HANNAH, CAN YOU HEAR ME?"-CHAPLIN'S GREAT DICTATOR, "SCHTONK," AND THE VICISSITUDES OF VOICE Adrian Daub In an article that appeared in the New Yor\ Times attending the release of City Lights in 1931, Charlie Chaplin sketches the transition from silent to talking picture and outlines the terms of his own "Rejection of the Talk ies." Like film theoreticians and other practitioners of the time, Chaplin offers a lapsal narrative in which we move from an idyllic situation that requires no (spoken) language to one that replaces the imaginative work of the audience with a mere receptivity to "the particular tongue of par ticular races."1 On this view, the introduction of sound cinema abolished the freewheeling internationalism of the silent films with their easily sub stituted intertitles, their montage principle, and a gestural vocabulary as sumed to be nearly universal. In both discourses, then, visuality is played off against vocality, and their interactions are mapped in explicitly political categories. This essay argues that it is this question of voice versus image in film and the role of voice and vision in theorizations of Fascism that underpin Chaplin's at tempt to challenge Nazism in and through film and comedy. If Hitler was to be unmasked by being seen (as the buffoonish Adenoid Hynkel) since he could not be unmasked simply by being heard (as Picard's image of the warning sign seems to suggest), how exactly would visuality undo the work of his voice and what would be the nature of both this work and its undoing? In negotiating the difficult intersection of exorcising voice by means of voice, Chaplin's film will turn out to draw on traditions that go GREAT DICTATOR
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far beyond the scope of him aesthetics and stretch back to the very origins of the Western philosophical project.
When Chaplin released The Great Dictator in the United States in
1940, theater marquees crowed that "he speaks" in the film. Indeed, the comedian's first full sound film (over a decade after the invention of the medium) has Chaplin delivering a bilingual performance, culminating in three public speeches (including one radio address), the first two in the highly comedic gibberish of dictator Hynkel and a second, senti mental one in the everyman's English of the Jewish barber. German
American groups attacked the former two, taking them to implicitly community-as-subject (which then in turn implies a set of Others), ex tends to the talking picture as well. But, of course, The Great Dictator is a talking picture itself and has to be if it wants to expose the dictator's voice.
Chaplin himself remarked in an interview that he didn't want the theater In fact, Hynkel's discourse is overlaid with not one but two voice-overs. If this is indeed the function of the second voice-over (in itself a rather hackneyed device), it may well be a late addition to the scene-bespeaking perhaps a certain anxiety with the scene even during the film's editing process. It would certainly constitute a misreading of the speech on the film's part. Of course, when Hynkel fulminates against "de Juten," a half minute-long tirade that the interpreter helpfully condenses into "his Ex cellency has just referred to the Jews," then clearly the incongruousness is meant to suggest that if the Phooey were to be translated faithfully, the full extent of his inhumanity might slip out. On that reading, however, the people of Tomania would be essentially in on the secret. After all, they presumably don't need this translation; they already (and nonmediatedly) understand their Phooey. If, then, the translation constitutes basically a dissimulation of Hynkel's "true" meaning, the voice-over divides the lis teners into two camps: those initiates whose inhumanity is evident in that Something quite similar seems to be true in The Great Dictator: the uni versal logic of images is opposed to the kind of affective content that trav els "beneath" semantic content in the phonetic output from body to body.
While animal and semantic voice are not starkly dichotomized in The
Great Dictator, the semantic aspect of Hynkel's discourse is in question throughout the film (and leads to the dictator's demise); the only thing that seems to reliably furnish its content is the "mere voice" of the animal pro jecting and inspiring pleasure and pain. What is more, Hynkel's voice seems to be more rawly physical yet: Given his gibberish, we can never get a sense of how exactly his speeches can be as effective as they are to their listeners. The only effects the film demonstrates (in visual fashion) are the effects of the pure physicality of his voice, which are shown to in turn af fect the physical world rather than the mind-its force literally distends microphones, blows the poor barber across the shtetl streets, and lashes about Field Marshal Herring.
In the terms proposed by Cavarero, then, The Great Dictator appears not only as an extension of the Enlightenment project, granting public lexical meaning the power to displace private emotion in the name of progress-it also reveals itself to be imbued with a Platonic legacy that distrusts above all the enunciating embodied voice. The film views pub lic, meaningful communication as above all the province of the visual.
Just as, on the Platonic picture, men are to turn away from the physical world and the body toward the (visual) contemplation of the ideas, The What is more, the barber does not strictly speaking react to the dicta :or's speech as though it were a physical force-he reacts to his voice; he is buffeted about by the cadences, the outbursts, the sheer physicality of the /oice, not by its references to de Juten or a blitzkrieg. As in Henneke's indicative of some sort of process or development, may remind us of noth ing so much as intertitles.39
Here, then, the purity of the "silent" film image is juxtaposed with the obtrusive onslaught of a particular voice, a voice that, while dis-embodied and mediated by loudspeakers, nevertheless is terrifyingly physical and irrupts into the tramp's world with the force of a natural disaster. Yet The If the dictator's voice can find an antidote, it cannot be visual but has to be vocal-somehow, the film needs to find its way to a universal voice.
# # *
The problem of translation, be it linguistic or medial-that is, the ques tion of how to return from one "particular tongue" to one that transcends the "particular races"-may well constitute the central anxiety of The Great Dictators closing scene. The film has set itself up for this problem, insisting that if real, communicative speech were to take the place of Hynkel's half-hysterical, half-cynical ejaculations, those cheering him would somehow be roused from their mindless devotion. In its climactic as to just what makes Hynkel's discourse so pernicious, this second speech recurrently collapses into the tropes of the first. Unlike Hynkel's speech, the barber's is presented without commentary.
Rather than be introduced by one voice, translated by another, which is then in turn commented on by the first, the fake Hynkel is introduced by Garbitsch, to whom he responds in much of his improvised speech. From the very outset, then, the speech is conceived as a dialogue: it has addressees, interlocutors, and a "message" to get across, and is as insistently public as
Hynkel's language is private and obscene. And it is actually its felicity that is in question, that hangs in the balance at the film's climax, whereas
Hynkel's verbal acrobatics constituted more or less a fait accompli (or, in the case of the radio address, a force of nature) that had to be dealt with one way or another. Indeed, it is another one of the film's indictments of the dictator's speech that his elocution has no conditions of felicity: since it isn't real communication, it can neither succeed nor go wrong, Hynkel's "How was I?" notwithstanding. But where Hynkel's speech is simply an event, meaningless in and for itself, the barber's climactic speech is one last desperate attempt at making sense.
This desperation, however, creates a different set of problems for the film. For one thing, the barber's speech is played absolutely straight, with communication, community, and publicity. After all, The Great Dictator persistently characterizes Hynkel (and that means primarily his body) through his inability to communicate.
In one famous sequence (repeated thrice in the film) the Hitler/Hynkel salute is exposed (not entirely implausibly) as a negation of interpersonal commu nication. Benzini Napaloni, the dictator of Bacteria, has just stepped out of his train and extends his hand to Hynkel. Hynkel, however, is engaged in the Hynkel salute; when both realize their mistake, they switch posi tions (figure 4). As Tilman Allert has noted, this strange salute "intensifies and indeed it turns increasingly to visual metaphors to make its point. But it is at this point that the de-privileged, dangerous terms all make their re appearance-the very metaphoricity of the speech, its insistently rhetorical character, opens it up to a different kind of slippage. The barber's speech does not leave verbal communication for the insinuations of pure voice; it does, however, within the realm of lexical, communicative language, fall back into the mode of Hynkel-speak, becoming once again exclusive, paro chial, and emphatically bodily. In attempting to skirt sonority, the speech relies on rhetorical tropes, in order to dispel the voice it falls prey to figura tive language-and in so doing reintroduces the repressed terms medium (in the guise of technological relay), body (in the guise of sentimentality), in favor a political speech (and an emphatically unfunny one at that), the film can maintain the binaries it has been relying on in its critique. Never theless, this raises a different specter for the film: sentimentality.
Indeed, Chaplin's speech becomes highly problematic in the Aristote lian matrix deployed in the film's first two public speeches; its juxtaposi tion of a-semantic animal vocality and the signifying phone semanti\e, revolved around a semantic appeal to ratio, on the one hand, and a senti mental-emotional appeal to the body, on the other. The speech, of which he was inordinately proud and which he not only performed as a radio lecture during the war but which he reproduced in toto in his 1964 autobiography,''5 is not so much emphatically communicative (although its mise-en-scene is, as we have seen) as it is emphatically affective. In other words, it hopes to evoke feelings rather than convey information. These two aspects of the scene dismayed Chaplin's left-leaning friends when the film was released: its unabashed reliance on cliche46 (an excess of emotion) and its fundamental confusion as to what it regards as the root of the Fas cism that it sets out to undo. Indeed, Chaplin's barber invokes hatred and greed, suggesting a reading of Hynkel as a scion of big capital (not an un common view among many of Chaplin's friends), but he similarly invokes the evil of nationalism, suggesting that perhaps those who follow Hynkel desire being misled; he then inveighs against "machine men with machine hearts," suggesting something like a Modern Times' critique of capitalism. Most fundamentally, though, it is the barber's invocation of the "de spair" and "misery" of his audience that makes Chaplin's interpretation of Fascism hard to read. The barber proclaims, "To those who can hear me, I say, do not despair. The misery that is now upon us is but the passing of greed, the bitterness of men who fear the way of human progress." But who does he proclaim it to? Who is the proclamation's audience? Within the logic of the film, the remark is addressed at Hannah and her fellow This would mean that the people of Tomania, including the "sons and daughters of the Double Cross," are nothing but victims of Hynkel. Their community with their Phooey is entirely fictive-enraptured by his voice, they eat sawdust. The film thus seems to discount the possibility (quite actual, as we know today) that there is an active "working towards the Phooey" (to purloin Ian Kershaw's famous phrase48), a desire to be de ceived by this little man, on the part of the Tomanian people. As I've showed in the case of the first speech, the film is fundamentally ambiva lent about the role of the audience (within the film and, in its anxieties about the filmic medium, the film's own audience, as well). reotypical Hollywood baddies, and its timely message about the evils of Fascism into a stereotypical happy ending. Its anxieties about mass media thus ultimately serve to usher the film into the most highly conditioned and formulaic filmic vocabulary available to Chaplin. And while his little man most decisively leaves behind his tramp character in delivering this speech (Chaplin never again played the tramp on screen), the sequence really folds the SS goons into the evil child-service workers, strikebreak ing riot police, and construction-site foremen of his earlier films.
The barber's moral indignation (unlike Chaplin's, one presumes) is thus no different from that expressed by his little tramp when goons take away
